Asymmetric information in a search model with social contacts by Stupnytska, Yuliia
Center for
Mathematical Economics
Working Papers 548
November 2015
Asymmetric information in a search model
with social contacts
Yuliia Stupnytska
Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Bielefeld University
Universita¨tsstraße 25
D-33615 Bielefeld · Germany
e-mail: imw@uni-bielefeld.de
http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/wp/
ISSN: 0931-6558
Asymmetric information in a search model with social contacts
Yuliia Stupnytska∗
November 6, 2015
Abstract
In this paper, the search model is proposed, in which homogeneous firms are uncertain
about the job seekers’ number of friends, who can help them in the job search (social capital).
All workers have the same productivity and differ only in the social capital. A firm offers a
take-it-or-leave-it wage contract to a worker after checking the worker’s profile and her public
number of non-fictitious social contacts in the Social Network System in the Internet. This
number serves as a noisy signal of the social capital for firms and cannot be influenced by
the worker only for signalling purpose. The model generates a positive relationship between
the number of contacts in the Social Network System and the wage offered by firms in
the equilibrium. In addition, the presence of firm’s uncertainty with respect to workers’
possibilities to find jobs through social contacts increases overall social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty with respect to worker characteristics is one of the most important problems in the
hiring process and has been intensively studied in the literature since the works of Akerlof (1970)
and Spence (1973) on asymmetric information about the worker’s productivity (for instance,
Guash and Weiss (1980), Samuelson (1984), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Alonso (2014)).
In addition, there are many recent models studying the issue of asymmetric information in a
search-theoretical framework. For example, in their paper, Guerrieri et al. (2010) add search and
matching frictions to the classical problems in economies with adverse selection. Kennan (2010)
extends the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model to allow for private information about the
match productivity on the firms’ side. Moreover, Bruegemann and Moscarini (2010) investigate
the search model with two-sided private information about gains from a match. Related papers
are, for example, Dao (2009), Delacroix and Wasmer (2009), Michelacci and Suarez (2006),
Acemoglu (1995), Kugler and Saint-Paul (2004).
In addition, there is strong empirical evidence that 30 - 60% of new employees find jobs
through their social contacts (see for example Staiger (1990), Granovetter (1995), Pistaferri
(1999), Kugler (2003), Pelizarri (2010), Bentolila et. al. (2010) for different countries). More-
over, the popularity of electronic Social Network Systems (SNS) like LinkedIn, Xing or Facebook
in the last decade made it easier to maintain social connections and use them for the job search.1
These observations increase the importance of incorporating the social contacts’ aspects into the
theoretical models of labour market.
Montgomery (1991) is a first theoretical paper which includes both the uncertainty of firms
with respect to worker’s productivity and the presence of job referrals. In this model, it was found
that social contacts’ use in the job search may lead to a lower mismatch and therefore, to a higher
production efficiency. Due to the pioneering assumption that referrals reveal the quality of the
match, also emphasized, for example, in the theoretical paper of Simon and Warner (1992) and
approved in the empirical work of Hensvik and Skans (2013), firms with more ability-sensitive
technology will hire through social contacts. Therefore, there will be more good matches due to
referrals. The classical view in the models on uncertainty not including networks, however, is
that asymmetric information generally leads to more inefficiency in the economy (for example,
Akerlof (1970), Guerierri et al. (2010), Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), Bruegemann and
Moscarini (2010), Delacroix and Wasmer (2009)). These mixed results, thus, motivate for more
research on these issues.
In particular, it would be natural to think, that the presence of firm’s uncertainty with
respect to workers’ possibilities to find jobs through social contacts in addition to the asymmetric
information about their productivity will create even larger inefficiency. One of the present
paper’s main objectives is, thus, to investigate this question, which is novel to the literature.
More precisely, this paper studies the consequences of the former uncertainty while allowing the
worker’s productivity to be the common knowledge for simplicity. Let us now shortly describe
the main ingredients of the theoretical model.
In this paper, the random matching model is proposed, in which homogeneous firms face
1According to Statista (2014), 87% (23%) of U.S. Internet users, who are 18-29 years old, 73% (31%) of 30-49
years old and 63% (30%) of 50-64 years old used Facebook (LinkedIn) in September 2014. Similar numbers are
presented also by Pew Research Center (2014). These numbers are larger than in the previous years.
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uncertainty about the social capital of job seekers, who have equal productivity and all other
observable characteristics. The term social capital denotes the number of actual contacts of a
worker, who typically can help her to find a job in addition to her own job search through the
formal channel of public offers. Thus, workers who have a larger social capital, have also larger
outside options (reservation wage) in terms of job search. This number is known perfectly to
workers. For simplicity, only two worker types are considered - with a low and high number of
actual contacts. Wages are assumed to be offered only by firms in a form of a take-it-or-leave-it
offer during the interview with a job seeker. A worker accepts a wage contract if it is at least as
large as her outside options. In addition, wages are set in such a way that workers will have an
incentive to exert an endogenous effort which increases the duration of a match.
A firm knows only the distribution of workers’ social capital (or of worker types) in the
economy and has to offer such a wage contract to a worker, so that she accepts it, otherwise
a firm is left with an open vacancy and receives zero profit in the equilibrium. An important
feature of the model is that firms also check the worker’s profile and her public number of non-
fictitious social contacts in the Social Network Systems in the Internet during the interview.
This number is assumed to be correlated to the actual number of friends and, therefore, serves
as a noisy signal of the social capital for firms when they decide about the wage offer. A worker
knows that her profile is being checked.2
This ingredient of the model is supported by the recent empirical evidence. For instance, in
the nationwide survey in the U.S., which was conducted on behalf of CareerBuilder in February
2013, and included more than 2,100 hiring managers and human resource professionals, it was
found that ”nearly 39 percent of firms use SNS to research job candidates, up from 37 percent
in 2012” (CarreerBuilder.com (2013))3. Among other general personal characteristics of an
individual, the firms pay attention, whether the job seeker has great communication skills and
whether other people posted great references about the candidate (CarreerBuilder.com (2013)).
Moreover, Roulin and Bangerter (2013) find from the 96 HR managers’ survey, that recruiters
also focus on the number of friends generated by the SNS, since it may reflect the applicants
network4.
In addition, Bohnert and Ross (2010) have conducted the laboratory experiment, where
it was found that the candidates having alcohol-oriented pictures in their profile were offered
7 percent less salary than candidates having family-oriented pictures. At the same time, Utz
(2010) proposes a sociological experiment, which shows, that the person’s profile, profile pictures
of the friends and number of friends jointly influence others’ impressions, since the number of
contacts is more likely to be manipulated.5 Hence, the public number of contacts, which a
2Vicknair et al. (2010) report that 45.3% students believe that employers and recruiters look at job candidates’
social networking profiles all of the time.
3Further, Manant et al. (2014) conduct an experiment with two fictitious Facebook profiles of applicants that
differ in their origin, in which they find the strong evidence (40% difference) that employers rely on the online
information when deciding to call an applicant back for interview. ”IT is the industry using it the most, at a
whopping 52 percent. The least? Health care, at 28 percent. Employers are primarily using Facebook (65 percent)
and LinkedIn (63 percent) to research candidates” (CarreerBuilder.com (2012)). Employers are using all the tools
available to them to assure they make the correct hiring decision, and the use of social media continues to grow”,
says Rosemary Haefner, vice president of human resources at CareerBuilder (CarreerBuilder.com (2013)).
4They also report that professional SNS (e.g., LinkedIn) is perceived as a potential antecedent of Person-Job
fit and personal SNS (e.g., Facebook) - of Person-Organization fit.
5Therefore, one can conclude, that hiring managers try to get an overall impression about the candidates
personality, communal orientation, social attractiveness etc. and about her possibilities to be referred for a job.
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firm can look up in an SNS is not necessarily the one generated by the system, but rather the
approximate number of contacts who would be ready and able to help the person to find a job
from the firm’s point of view6.
In the present model, it is also assumed for simplicity that all job-seekers have SNS profiles
and all firms look them up. Another simplifying assumption is that workers cannot increase
their public number of contacts (make the overall impression and social attractiveness better)
only for the signalling purpose or, equivalently, firms can identify this manipulation quite easily.
In this paper, there are two wage contracts for simplicity, that are intended at workers
with low and high number of actual friends, respectively. A (partially) separating equilibrium
is considered, which follows a threshold rule w.r.t. a signal according to a firms’ indifference
condition. In this equilibrium, the higher wage will be accepted by both worker types and the
lower wage only by the low types leading only to partial separation.
The model generates a positive relationship between the number of contacts in the Social
Network System in the Internet and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. Thus, there will
be a wage dispersion between equally productive workers with different number of contacts in the
Internet, which extends the classical result on wage dispersion with respect to the signal in the
literature on uncertainty about the worker’s productivity (see, for example, Spence (1973))7.
Moreover, this model gives an additional explanation for the empirically observed log wage
dispersion between workers with equal productivity and other observable characteristics of about
70% (e.g. Mortensen (2003)). In addition, this model is in line with the theoretical literature
emphasizing the positive effect of referrals on wages and the wage dispersion due to the difference
in the number of social contacts. For instance, such theoretical papers as Montgomery (1992)
and Ioannides and Soetevent (2006) incorporate the similar mechanism as in the present paper,
namely, that social contacts increase the reservation wage. This positive effect is found also in
many empirical works, for example, in Staiger (1990), Simon and Warner (1992), Granovetter
(1995), Margolis and Simonnet (2003) and Goos and Salomons (2007) for different countries.
Overall, however, the theory and evidence on the effect of social contacts on wages are mixed8.
In addition, the comparative statics w.r.t. the firms’ uncertainty level increase was conducted.
Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes were compared numerically with the two extreme cases: the
case of perfect information, when workers’ social capital is observed perfectly, and the case of a
full information asymmetry, when firms don’t have any reliable signal to make inferences about
workers’ outside options. It was found that (reservation) wages, the overall average firm’s profit
and average workers’ income levels in the benchmark case lead to those arising in the case of
a full information asymmetry as the firms’ uncertainty level increases. Thus, naturally, the
equilibrium outcomes in the asymmetric information case are in between of these two extreme
cases.
The overall average workers’ income is decreasing since the average workers’ income of low
6Indeed, among adults, on average, 37% of their total Facebook friends are reported to be actual friends
(Ellison et al. (2014)) and, among undergraduate students, 25% are their actual friends (Ellison et al. (2011)).
7The present framework can be easily changed in order to analyze the relationship between the wage offered and
the test score during the interview with a worker, where the test score is a noisy signal of a worker’s productivity. In
this case workers will be different in the productivity, but not in the job-finding rate. The present model, however,
aims at analyzing the opposite case, when workers differ in the job-finding rate, but not in the productivity.
8Bentolila, Michelacci and Suarez (2010) report wage penalties in the United States and the European Union.
This result is supported by Delattre and Sabatier (2007), Pistaferri (1999) as well as Addison and Portugal (2002)
for France, Italy and Portugal respectively.
4
types is increasing slower than that of high types is decreasing. The overall average firms’ profit
is increasing since the number of vacancies decreases. The overall social welfare is increasing and
is larger than those in the two extreme cases for the large level of uncertainty since the overall
average firms’ profit is increasing faster the overall average workers’ income is decreasing. This
result may seem counterintuitive.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies thus decreasing their
overall cost and leading to the welfare increase. So the information asymmetry turns out to be
welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which they would not like to
employ. In the standard search theory with perfect information (for example, Pissarides (2000)),
the social welfare is maximized when the workers’ bargaining power is equal to the elasticity
of the job-filling rate. This result is known as the Hosios condition. Otherwise, when their
bargaining power is too low (high), firms will open too many (few) vacancies due to low (high)
wages leading to more inefficiency. Since in the present model the wage is offered only by firms,
the workers’ wages are relatively low. This gives an intuition why the social welfare in the perfect
information case is not the largest since the Hosios condition is not satisfied.
It is interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991) that social
contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between firms
and workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, a higher level of
mismatched wages offered contributes to the increase in the welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains notation and the general labour market
environment. In section 3 the decisions of workers and firms are investigated and the equilibrium
outcome is presented. Section 4 compares the benchmark case of the model to the perfect
information case and section 5 compares it to the another extreme case of a full information
asymmetry. Section 6 discusses the issue of social welfare comparison between these three cases.
Section 7 illustrates the theoretical results and comparative statics by means of a numerical
example, while section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Labour market modeling framework
The labour market is characterized by the following properties. There is a continuum of infinitely
lived risk neutral workers and firms discounting future at a common discount rate r. Firms are
homogeneous and free to enter the labour market by opening a new vacancy with the flow cost
c of travelling and accommodation of job seekers and advertising job offers in the Internet,
newspapers, job fairs etc.
All the workers in the economy have the same productivity y, but differ only in the number
of actual contacts (or social capital), which is their private information in the benchmark case
of the model. These contacts may help them in the job search (informal channel) in addition
to the formal search in a public job market and therefore, influence their outside options. It is
assumed that the search is costless through both channels for simplicity. The matching between
workers and firms is random. Wages are assumed to be only offered by firms (take-it-or-leave-it
offer) during the interview and a worker accepts the wage contract if it exceeds or is equal to
her outside options. For simplicity, let there be only two types of workers: with low and high
5
social capital, i.e. with the number of actual contacts nL or nH , respectively. They are further
also referred to as type i workers, where i = L,H. Firms are aware about the values of nL and
nH and about the distribution of worker types. Denote the fraction of workers who have a low
social capital as Pr(nL). Then, the fraction of workers with the high social capital is equal to
Pr(nH) = 1− Pr(nL).
Let the total measure of workers be equal to 1. A worker can be either employed or unem-
ployed. Let ui be the mass of unemployed workers of type i (with µi = ui/Pr(ni) being their
unemployment rate) and ei - the mass of corresponding employed workers in the benchmark
case, so that ei +ui = Pr(ni). In addition, firms can see the worker’s public number of contacts
n′i in the Social Network Systems in the Internet which is correlated to ni and therefore serves
as a noisy signal of ni for firms when they decide about the wage offer during the interview. It
is assumed for simplicity that workers cannot increase their number n′i only for the signalling
purpose.
Moreover, firms intend to provide workers with correct incentives. When employed the
worker of a particular type chooses an optimal effort level g ≥ 0 conditional on the contract
wage offered her by the firm. This effort is unobservable to the firm. The cost of exerting effort
g is k(g), where it is assumed that k(0) = 0, k′(g) > 0. Every firm-worker match is subject
to the separation rate δ(g), which is modeled as a decreasing function of g (δ′(g) < 0) as in
Zaharieva (2010) in such a way inducing workers to exert more effort in order to increase the
match duration. Let us consider throughout the paper the example when the separation rate
δ(g) takes the following form: δ(g) = 1/(
√
g + d0) (diminishing returns of effort to the job
duration). The constant d0 > 0 denotes the minimal job duration corresponding to zero effort.
Let also the effort cost function take a usual quadratic form, i.e. k(g) = k0g
2, where k0 > 0 is a
constant multiplier.
Let m(u, v) denote a matching function between workers and firms, where v is the number of
open vacancies and u =
∑
i ui is the overall number of unemployed workers. For simplicity, let
us assume that the matching technology is quadratic, that is m(u, v) = uv.9 Consider first the
formal search channel. The number of matches between open vacancies and unemployed workers
of type i is given by vu · ui
u
= vui, meaning that their job-finding rate through this channel of
job search is equal to
vui
ui
= v.
In addition, unemployed workers can hear about open vacancies through their actual social
contacts. First, an employee hears about a new job opening at an exogenous rate a per unit
time as in Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Then, this employee transmits the vacancy information
to one randomly chosen unemployed friend out of a pool of her actual contacts. Thus, the
firm is not aware whether the person has found a job in the formal way or received vacancy
information through the network. Let us introduce the additional parameter γ denoting the
level of homophily between the actual social contacts of a worker, i.e. when γ = 1 all the
workers with low (high) number of friends are in contact only with also low (high) types and
when γ = 0.5 there is no homophily. In general, for γ ∈ [0.5, 1], γni contacts of a type-i worker
are of the same type and (1− γ)ni contacts are of the opposite type.
For the special case of the full homophily, γ = 1, the job finding rate of a type-i worker
9This approach is also used, for example, in Gautier et al. (2010). Moreover, this technology may be, due to
Teulings and Gautier (2004), the most adequate assumption in models with heterogeneous workers.
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λi = avei
[1− (1− µi)ni ]
ui
= av(1 − µi) [1− (1− µi)
ni ]
µi
as in Stupnytska and Zaharieva (2015).
The expression in square brackets is the probability that there is at least one unemployed worker
among the ni contacts of an employed worker. This case will be taken as a benchmark throughout
the paper for the sake of simplicity. According to Rivera et al. (2010), social networks tend to
exhibit a high level of homophily with respect to such characteristics as age, gender, religion,
ethnicity, values, intelligence, and education. Indeed, this case may, for instance, capture the
situation when foreigners (natives) are more likely to be in contact with other foreigners (natives)
and, thus, to be members of a network with low (high) number of contacts. Thus, in this case,
the larger is the number of actual contacts of the worker of type i the larger is her λi. The
expression for λi can be also easily modified for the case of γ < 1.
10
As it is mentioned above, firms don’t observe the actual number of contacts ni of a worker
but look up the number of contacts n′i in the Internet during the interview in order to make an
inference about ni (and, hence, about her outside options) and to offer on this basis such a wage
contract that a worker of type i will accept. This noisy signal n′i is assumed to be correlated to
ni, i.e. n
′
i = ni + , where the observation error of the firm  is normally distributed with the
mean 0 and the standard deviation σ, i.e. N(0, σ
2
 ).
Therefore, a worker with ni actual contacts knows that a firm will draw the number of
contacts n′i from the conditional distribution with the c.d.f. F (n
′|ni) and the density f(n′|ni)
having the mean ni and the standard deviation σ:
F (n′|ni) : N(ni, σ2 )
On the other hand, a firm infers the probability that the unemployed worker has nL actual
contacts conditional on the observed signal n′. It can be found from the Bayes’ rule:
Pr(nL|n′) = 1− Pr(nH |n′) = f(n
′|nL) · β
f(n′|nL) · β + f(n′|nH) · (1− β)
where β =
uL
uL + uH
is the probability that the worker met is of type-L and 1− β = uH
uL + uH
is
the probability that this worker is of type-H.
Assume for simplicity that, when offering wage contracts, firms follow the threshold rule
w.r.t. a signal according to the ex-post indifference condition and then let us check whether
10Let us denote the type opposite to the type i by j. The probability that there is at least one unemployed
worker among the ni contacts of a type-i employed worker is equal to [1 − (1 − µi)γni(1 − µj)(1−γ)ni ] as (1 −
µi)
γni(1−µj)(1−γ)ni is the probability that all her contacts are employed. Let the average unemployment rate in
the network of type-i workers be equal to µ¯i = γµi+(1−γ)µj . With the probability γµi
µ¯i
the unemployed worker,
to whom the vacancy information is transmitted, is also of type i and with the probability
(1− γ)µj
µ¯i
this worker
is of the opposite type. The probability that there will be a match between a firm and a given type-i unemployed
worker through any of her type-i employed contacts is then equal to avei[1 − (1 − µi)γni(1 − µj)(1−γ)ni ]γµi
µ¯i
.
Analogously, the probability that there will be a match between a firm and this worker through any of her type-j
employed contacts is then equal to avej [1− (1−µj)γnj (1−µi)(1−γ)nj ] (1− γ)µi
µ¯j
. The job finding rate of a type-i
worker, λi, through this channel is then the sum of these two expressions divided by ui:
λi = av[(1− µi)[1− (1− µi)γni(1− µj)(1−γ)ni ] γ
µ¯i
+ (1− µj)[1− (1− µj)γnj (1− µi)(1−γ)nj ] (1− γ)
µ¯j
]
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there will be such a separating equilibrium in this economy. Denote the two wage contracts
that are intended at the workers with nL and nH number of actual friends by wL and wH ,
respectively. If the outside options of type-H workers are larger than those of type-L workers
only because of the higher job-finding rate for a given wage, the wage wH offered must be larger
than wL (which itself must be less than the reservation wage of high types in the separating
equilibrium) for the workers with nH contacts to accept. Otherwise, the position which met the
high type worker remains vacant and the firm receives zero profit in the equilibrium. Denote
the threshold value of the signal n′, for which firms are indifferent between offering the wage wL
and wH , by n¯
′. This means that after observing n′ ≤ n¯′ a firm will offer the wage wL and, in the
opposite case, it will offer wH . Thus, there will be a positive correlation between the number
of contacts in the Social Network System and the wage offered by firms in the equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, the wage wH will be accepted by both worker types and the wage wL - only by
the low types leading only to partial separation. In order to fully characterize this equilibrium
outcome, let us first consider the workers’ and then the firms’ side.
3 Analysis of the model
3.1 Workers: effort choice
Consider first the partial equilibrium case when the number of vacancies v is exogenously given.
Let Ui denote the present value of an unemployed worker of type i = L,H or her outside options.
In addition, let WL and WLH denote the asset value of a type-L worker employed at the wage
wL and, by the firm’s mistake, at the wage wH , respectively, and let WH be the present value
of a type-H worker employed at wage wH .
Both firms and workers are interested in more effort to be exerted on the job, since it increases
the match duration, which is profitable for workers as well as for firms as in Zaharieva (2010).
Denote the effort level of the type-i worker induced by the wage wi offered as gi and the effort
level of type-L worker in response to the wage wH offered as gLH in case when the firm has made
a mistake. Wi and WLH then also denote the asset values of an employed worker exerting the
optimal effort level gi and gLH , respectively. The Bellman equations for the employed workers
choosing different effort levels can be then written as:
rWi = max
gi
{wi− k(gi)− δ(gi)(Wi−Ui)} rWLH = max
gLH
{wH − k(gLH)− δ(gLH)(WLH −UL)}
(1)
Equations (1) show that workers face a tradeoff between the gain from a lower separation
rate δ(g) and the cost of exerting effort k(g). A worker of type i employed at the wage wi
maximizes the rent Wi−Ui w.r.t. gi given Ui and a worker of type L employed at the wage wH
maximizes the job surplus (WLH −UL) w.r.t. gLH given UL. The first order conditions for these
two problems can be written as:
Wi − Ui = wi − k(gi)− rUi
r + δ(gi)
= |k
′(gi)
δ′(gi)
| WLH − UL = wH − k(gLH)− rUL
r + δ(gLH)
= |k
′(gLH)
δ′(gLH)
| (2)
Thus, from equations (2) (incentive compatibility constraints) the optimal effort level gi can
be expressed as a function of wi− rUi and gLH as a function of wH − rUL. Then, analogously to
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Lemma 1 in Zaharieva (2010) one can show that for the convex cost function k(g), gi (gLH) is
increasing in wi−rUi (wH−rUL) for a given Ui (UL) when δ′′(gi) < 0 (δ′′(gLH) < 0). Moreover,
the optimal effort level gi (gLH) is equal to 0 when wi = rUi (wH = rUL). These conditions
hold for the assumed functional forms of k(g) and δ(g).
This mechanism of the optimal effort choice ensures that conditions Wi − Ui > 0 ⇔ rUi <
wi − k(gi) and, therefore, rUi < wi hold. Hence, for the existence of the semi-separating
equilibrium discussed above assume that the condition wL < rUH , which prevents high types
from accepting the low wage, holds. To summarize, for this equilibrium to exist, the following
condition should hold:
rUL < wL < rUH < wH (3)
In the numerical example (section 7) it is checked that the condition wL < rUH holds for the
realistic parameter values and that it will be indeed optimal for firms to offer wages according
to the threshold rule.
All unemployed workers receive the unemployment benefit z and can find a job through the
both search channels with the rate λi + v depending on the type. In the equilibrium, workers
correctly anticipate the threshold value n¯′. A type-L unemployed, therefore, expects to be
employed at the wage wL when the signal n
′ drawn by the firm is less than n¯′ and at the wage
wH otherwise. The Bellman equation for UL can be, thus, written as follows:
rUL = z + (λL + v)[Pr(n
′ ≤ n¯′|nL)(WL − UL) + (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))(WLH − UL)] (4)
where the probability Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) is equivalent to F (n¯′|nL).
A type-H unemployed accepts only the wage wH in the equilibrium. However, this wage
is offered by a firm only when the signal n′ drawn is larger than n¯′. The present value of
unemployment for the worker with nH contacts can, thus, be written as follows:
rUH = z + (λH + v)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH))(WH − UH) (5)
where the probability Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH) is equivalent to F (n¯′|nH).
3.2 Firms: wage determination
Let V denote the present value of the open vacancy, which will be defined later. In the equilibrium
it is equal to 0 (the free-entry condition). Assume that, when choosing wages, firms maximize
their ex-ante expected profit (before the realization of a signal) with respect to wages wL and
wH and the threshold value of the signal n¯
′ subject to their ex-post indifference condition (after
the realization of a signal):
maxwL,wH ,n¯′{β(Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)JL + Pr(n′ > n¯′|nL)JLH) + (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH)JH} (6)
s.t. Pr(nL|n¯′)JL = Pr(nL|n¯′)JLH + (1− Pr(nL|n¯′))JH (7)
Firms take β parametrically.
JL denotes the firm’s present value of profits from a worker employed at wage wL and
therefore exerting the effort level gL, which results in the separation rate δ(gL). JH (JLH) is
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the firm’s present value of profits from the high (low) type worker employed at wage wH and,
thus, exerting the effort level gH (gLH). The Bellman equations for JL, JLH and JH can be then
written as follows11:
rJL = y − wL − δ(gL)(JL − V ) (8)
rJLH = y − wH − δ(gLH)(JLH − V ) rJH = y − wH − δ(gH)(JH − V ) (9)
The maximization problem of a firm is intuitive. With probability βPr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) the worker
met by the firm is of type L and the signal n′ drawn by the firm is lower than the threshold value
n¯′. In this case, the firm receives the asset value JL from the job filled by the low type worker
who gets the wage wL. With probability βPr(n
′ > n¯′|nL) the worker met by the firm is of type
L, but the signal n′ drawn by the firm is higher than n¯′. In this case, the firm receives the asset
value JLH from the job filled by the low type worker who gets the wage wH . With probability
(1− β)Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH) this worker is of H-type and the signal drawn is smaller than n¯′. In this
case, the firm offers the wage wL and is left with an open vacancy (receives zero profit) since
the high type will not accept. With probability (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH) this worker is of H-type
and the signal was correctly drawn larger than n¯′. In this case, the firm receives the asset value
JH from the job filled by the high type worker who gets the wage wH .
The left hand side of the indifference condition is the ex-post expected profit of a firm (after
the realization of a signal) from offering the low wage wL to a worker with a signal n¯
′, which
will be accepted only when the worker is a low type. The right hand side is the expected profit
from proposing the high wage wH to a worker with a signal n¯
′, which is always accepted. With
the probability Pr(nL|n¯′) this worker will be of type L and with the opposite probability - of
type H.
In the numerical example (section 7) the values for optimal wL, wH and n¯
′ are found.
3.3 Steady-state equations and the free-entry condition
Denote the number of low types employed at high wage by eLH and at low wage by eLL so that
eLL + eLH = eL. Expressions for eLH and eLL can be found from the respective steady-state
equations:
e˙LH = 0 = uL(λL + v)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))− δ(gLH)eLH (10)
e˙LL = 0 = uL(λL + v)Pr(n
′ ≤ n¯′|nL)− δ(gL)eLL (11)
The mass of unemployed workers with nL actual contacts, uL, can find a job with probability
λL + v through both search channels and with probability (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)) this job pays a
high wage due to the firm’s mistake. This is the inflow into the state eLH . At the same time,
the mass of workers of type L employed at a high wage, eLH , can loose the job with probability
δ(gLH). This is the outflow out of this state. On the other hand, with the opposite probability
Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) the job found by these unemployed workers pays a low wage. This forms the
inflow into the state eLL. Similarly, the mass of workers of type L employed at a low wage, eLL,
can loose the job with probability δ(gL) determining the outflow out of this state.
11It is easy to see that gLH is always larger than gH in the equilibrium, and therefore, JLH is always larger
than JH .
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The steady-state equation for the number of unemployed low types can be then written as:
u˙L = 0 = δ(gL)eLL + δ(gLH)eLH − uL(λL + v) (12)
The mass of workers of type L employed at a low and high wage, eLL and eLH , can loose
a job with probabilities δ(gL) and δ(gLH), respectively, leading to the inflow into the state uL.
However, the unemployed low types, uL, can find any job with probability λL + v through both
search channels and form in such a way the outflow out of this state.
Therefore, from these three equations, the expressions for eLL, eLH and uL can be written
as:
eLL =
Pr(nL)δ(gLH)(λL + v)Pr(n
′ ≤ n¯′|nL)
(λL + v)[(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))δ(gL) + Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)δ(gLH)] + δ(gL)δ(gLH)
eLH =
Pr(nL)δ(gL)(λL + v)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))
(λL + v)[(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))δ(gL) + Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)δ(gLH)] + δ(gL)δ(gLH)
uL =
Pr(nL)δ(gL)δ(gLH)
(λL + v)[(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))δ(gL) + Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)δ(gLH)] + δ(gL)δ(gLH)
On the other hand, the steady-state equation for workers with nH actual contacts can be
written as follows:
u˙H = 0 = (Pr(nH)− uH)δ(gH)− uH(λH + v)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH)) (13)
The mass of employed workers of type H can loose a job with probability δ(gH) leading to
the inflow into the state uH . However, the unemployed high types can find a job with probability
λL + v through both search channels and accept it with probability (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH)) when
a high wage is offered. This determines the outflow out of this state. Thus, the number of
unemployed type-H workers, uH , is equal to:
uH =
Pr(nH)δ(gH)
(λH + v)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH)) + δ(gH)
Finally, a present value of an open vacancy denoted by V can be defined as follows. To fill an
open vacancy, firms are also using both search channels at the same time. At rate qi = λiui/v =
aPr(ni)(1 − µi)[1 − (1 − µi)ni ] a match between a firm and an unemployed worker of type i is
formed due to her social contacts and at rate ui the firm is matched with an unemployed worker
of type i through a formal channel. Since firms don’t know the worker’s type and whether
the worker has found a job in a formal way or through the network information transmission,
they expect to be matched with some unemployed worker with a rate qL + qH + u. Then, with
probability β this will be a low type. The firm will offer her the wage wL with probability
Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL) and the wage wH with the opposite probability, and a worker will always accept.
On the other hand, with probability 1 − β this will be a worker of high type, and a firm will
employ her at a wage wH only with probability Pr(n
′ > n¯′|nH), i.e. when it infers her type
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correctly. The asset value of an open vacancy is then equal to:
rV = 0 = −c+ (qL + qH + u)[β(Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)(JL − V ) + (1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL))(JLH − V )) +
+(1− β)(1− Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH))(JH − V )]
The expression in the square brackets is the expected profit of a firm from the maximization
problem (6). Hence the optimal firm strategy is chosen so that it maximizes the present value
of a vacancy V . In the equilibrium, V is equal to 0 (the free entry condition). This allows us to
find the last equilibrium variable, the number of vacancies v entering through the unemployment
rates. Thus, the described equilibrium can be formally defined in a following way:
Definition 1. Search equilibrium with asymmetric information and with the partial separation
of types is a vector of variables (Ui, Wi, WLH , Ji, JLH , gi, gLH , n¯
′, wi, µi, eLL, eLH), i = L,H
as well as the number of vacancies v and the present value of an open vacancy V , satisfying the
asset value equations for workers (4), (5) and (1), for firms (8) and (9), the firm’s maximization
problem (6), the optimal effort equations (2), the steady-state conditions (10), (11), (12) and
(13), the condition (3) and the free-entry condition V = 0.
In the numerical example (section 7) it is checked that this equilibrium exists for the realistic
parameter values.
4 Perfect information case
Let us now compare the equilibrium outcomes in a model with asymmetric information from the
previous section to those arising in the situation when firms are perfectly informed about the
worker type, i.e. when σ = 0. When the actual number of contacts is observed perfectly, the
wage w1i , i = L,H, inducing the optimal effort level g
1
i is offered to the workers with ni actual
contacts, which they always accept. To characterize these equilibrium variables, let us consider
the workers’ and the firms’ side for the case of perfect information.
Let v1 be the number of open vacancies in this case. Hence, analogously to the asymmetric
information case, the job-finding rate through the formal channel is now equal to v1. In addition,
let u1i and e
1
i denote the amounts of unemployed and employed workers of type i, respectively,
so that u1i + e
1
i = Pr(ni) and the unemployment rate of a worker of this type µ
1
i = u
1
i /Pr(ni).
Let the overall number of unemployed in this case be u1 =
∑
i u
1
i . Then, the job finding rate
through the social contacts’ channel is equal in this case to:
λ1i = av
1(1− µ1i )
[1− (1− µ1i )ni ]
µ1i
Hence, the equation for the present value of unemployment for type i workers can be written
in this case similarly to the equation for Ui as follows:
rU1i = z + (λ
1
i + v
1)(W 1i − U1i ) (14)
where, analogously to Wi for the case of asymmetric information, W
1
i denotes the asset value
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of employment at the wage w1i for the workers with ni actual contacts and is equal to:
rW 1i = max
g1i
{w1i − k(g1i )− δ(g1i )(W 1i − U1i )} (15)
Thus, from the first order conditions, one can show that the optimal effort level chosen by
type i workers, g1i is a function of w
1
i − rU1i with the similar properties as gi, i.e.:
W 1i − U1i =
w1i − k(g1i )− rU1i
r + δ(g1i )
= |k
′(g1i )
δ′(g1i )
| (16)
From the point of view of the firms, let V 1 denote the present value of the open vacancy,
defined later. Moreover, let J1i denote the firm’s present value from hiring the type i worker at
wage w1i and, thus, inducing the effort level g
1
i leading to the separation rate δ(g
1
i ). The Bellman
equation for J1i can be then written as follows:
rJ1i = y − w1i − δ(g1i )(J1i − V 1) (17)
The values of w1L and w
1
H offered by firms can be found from the firm’s expected profit
maximization problem:
max
w1L,w
1
H
{β1J1L + (1− β1)J1H} (18)
where β1 is the analogue of β for the perfect information case. Firms take β1 parametrically.
Thus, the solution to this problem gives rise to the following Proposition:
Proposition 1. The wage w1i , i = L,H offered by firms is equal to:
w1i = y −
(r + δ(g1i ))
2(k′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
δ′(g1i )3
Proof: Appendix I.
Since this wage is always accepted by a worker with ni number of contacts, the steady-state
condition for this worker type can be written as follows:
u˙1i = 0 = (Pr(ni)− u1i )δ(g1i )− u1i (λ1i + v1) (19)
Therefore the unemployment rate of type i workers, µ1i , is equal to:
µ1i =
δ(g1i )
λ1i + v
1 + δ(g1i )
To find the last equilibrium variable, the number of vacancies v1 from the free-entry condition,
let us define a present value of an open vacancy V 1 analogously to V from the previous section.
The job-filling rate through the social contacts in this case, q1i , is the analogue of qi and is equal
to λ1iu
1
i /v
1. When a worker met is of low type (with probability β1), a firm will always figure it
out correctly and offer her the wage w1L. On the other hand, when a firm meets a worker of high
type (with probability 1 − β1), it offers her the wage w1H . The asset value of an open vacancy
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in the perfect information case is then equal to:
rV 1 = 0 = −c+ (q1L + q1H + u1)(β1J1L + (1− β1)J1H)
Thus, the perfect information equilibrium can be formally defined in a following way:
Definition 2. Search equilibrium with perfect information is a vector of variables (U1i , W
1
i ,
J1i , V
1, g1i , w
1
i , µ
1
i , v
1), i = L,H, satisfying the asset value equations for workers (14) and
(15), for firms (17), the wage determination equation (18), the optimal effort equations (16),
the steady-state conditions (19) and the free-entry condition V 1 = 0.
This equilibrium is the special case of the equilibrium in the asymmetric information case
for σ = 0. In section 7 below, it is checked that this equilibrium exists for the realistic param-
eter values and the equilibrium outcomes in the perfect and asymmetric information case are
numerically compared.
5 Case of a full information asymmetry
This section now compares the benchmark model with asymmetric information to the other
extreme case when firms do not have any reliable signal about the worker type, i.e. when
σ →∞. This is the case of a full information asymmetry. In this case, the only one wage w0 is
offered by firms to all workers, which induces the workers with ni, i = L,H actual contacts to
exert the optimal effort level g0i .
Let v0 be the number of open vacancies in this case. Hence, analogously to the benchmark
case, the job-finding rate through the formal channel is now equal to v0. In addition, let u0i
and e0i denote the amounts of unemployed and employed workers of type i, respectively, so that
u0i + e
0
i = Pr(ni) and the unemployment rate of a worker of this type µ
0
i = u
0
i /Pr(ni). Let the
overall number of unemployed in this case be u0 =
∑
i u
0
i . Then, the job finding rate through
the social contacts’ channel is equal in this case to:
λ0i = av
0(1− µ0i )
[1− (1− µ0i )ni ]
µ0i
Hence, the expression for the present value of unemployment for type i workers, U0i , can be
written in this case similarly to the equation for Ui as follows:
rU0i = z + (λ
0
i + v
0)(W 0i − U0i ) (20)
where, analogously to Wi for the case of asymmetric information, W
0
i denotes the asset value
of employment at the wage w0 for the workers with ni actual contacts and is equal to:
rW 0i = max
g0i
{w0 − k(g0i )− δ(g0i )(W 0i − U0i )} (21)
Thus, from the first order conditions, one can show that the optimal effort level chosen by
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type i workers, g0i is a function of w
0 − rU0i with the similar properties as gi, i.e.:
W 0i − U0i =
w0 − k(g0i )− rU0i
r + δ(g0i )
= |k
′(g0i )
δ′(g0i )
| (22)
From the point of view of the firms, let V 0 denote the present value of the open vacancy,
defined later. Moreover, let J0i denote the firm’s present value from hiring the type i worker and,
thus, inducing the effort level g0i . The Bellman equation for J
0
i can be then written as follows:
rJ0i = y − w0 − δ(g0i )(J0i − V 0) (23)
The steady-state condition for this worker type can be written as follows:
u˙0i = 0 = (Pr(ni)− u0i )δ(g0i )− u0i (λ0i + v0) (24)
Therefore the unemployment rate of type i workers, µ0i , is equal to:
µ0i =
δ(g0i )
λ0i + v
0 + δ(g0i )
The value of w0 offered by a firm which has met the type i worker can be found from the
firm’s expected profit maximization problem:
max
w0
{β0J0L + (1− β0)J0H} (25)
where β0 is the analogue of β for the case of a full information asymmetry. Firms take β0
parametrically.
The solution to this maximization problem gives rise to the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. Let x0(g0i ) = (k
′′(g0i )δ
′(g0i )− δ′′(g0i )k′(g0i ))(r+ δ(g0i ))3, where i = L,H. Then,
the wage w0 offered by firms is equal to:
w0 = y −
x0(g0L)x
0(g0H) · [
β0
r + δ(g0L)
+
(1− β0)
r + δ(g0H)
]
β0(δ′(g0L))3x0(g
0
H) + (1− β0)(δ′(g0H))3x0(g0L)
Proof: Appendix II.
To find the last equilibrium variable, the number of vacancies v0, from the free-entry condi-
tion, let us define a present value of an open vacancy V 0 analogously to V 1 from the previous
section. The job-filling rate through the social contacts in this case, q0i , is the analogue of q
1
i
and is equal to λ0iu
0
i /v
0. The asset value of an open vacancy in this case is then equal to:
rV 0 = 0 = −c+ (q0L + q0H + u0)(β0J0L + (1− β0)J0H)
Thus, the equilibrium with a full information asymmetry can be formally defined in a fol-
lowing way:
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Definition 3. Search equilibrium with a full information asymmetry is a vector of variables
(U0i , W
0
i , J
0
i , V
0, g0i , µ
0
i , v
0), i = L,H, as well as the wage offer w0, satisfying the asset
value equations for workers (20) and (21), for firms (23), the wage determination equation (25),
the optimal effort equations (22), the steady-state conditions (24) and the free-entry condition
V 0 = 0.
In section 7 below, it is checked that this equilibrium exists for the realistic parameter values
and these equilibrium outcomes are also numerically compared with those in the perfect and
asymmetric information cases.
6 Social welfare comparison
The natural question in this model is, in which of the three cases considered above the overall
social welfare as well as workers’ income and firms’ profits are larger. First, denote by ΛWL
(ΛWH) the average income of low (high) type workers so that ΛW = ΛWL + ΛWH is the average
income of all workers. More precisely, these variables are defined as follows:
ΛWL = (wL − k(gL))eLL + (wH − k(gLH))eLH + zuL ΛWH = (wH − k(gH))eH + zuH
The average income of low types is equal to the sum of their wages net of the effort cost at
low and high wage jobs when employed plus the utility of unemployed workers of this type.
Analogously, the average income of high types is their wage net of the effort cost when employed
plus the utility of unemployed workers of this type. In addition, let ΛF be the average profit of
all firms, defined as:
ΛF = (y − wL)eLL + (y − wH)(eLH + eH)− cv
It is equal to the firms’ profits after hiring low types at both wage contracts and high types
at a high wage contract minus the cost of vacancies’ creation. It is then easy too see that
ΛW + ΛF = Λ, which is the overall social welfare level.
Analogously, let us define variables similar to ΛWL, ΛWH , ΛW , ΛF and Λ for the perfect
information case and the case of a full information asymmetry with upper indexes 1 and 0,
respectively. Expressions for average incomes of low and high types in the perfect information
case, Λ1WL and Λ
1
WH , respectively, can be written as follows:
Λ1WL = (w
1
L − k(g1L))e1L + zu1L Λ1WH = (w1H − k(g1H))e1H + zu1H
Intuitively, the average income of low (high) type workers in the perfect information case is
equal to the low (high) wage net of the low (high) effort cost when employed plus the utility of
unemployed low (high) types. Expressions for average incomes of low and high types in the case
of the full information asymmetry, Λ0WL and Λ
0
WH , respectively, can be written analogously as
follows:
Λ0WL = (w
0 − k(g0L))e0L + zu0L Λ0WH = (w0 − k(g0H))e0H + zu0H
Similarly, the average income of low (high) type workers in the case of the full information
asymmetry is equal to the wage w0 net of the low (high) effort cost when employed plus the
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utility of unemployed low (high) types. Expressions for average profits of firms in the perfect
information case and in the case of the full information asymmetry, Λ1F and Λ
0
F , respectively,
can be written as follows:
Λ1F = (y − w1L)e1L + (y − w1H)e1H − cv1 Λ0F = (y − w0)(e0L + e0H)− cv0
Λ1F equals to the firms’ profits after hiring low and high types at low and high wage, respectively,
minus the cost of vacancies’ creation. Analogously, Λ0F is equal to the firms’ profits after hiring
workers at the wage w0, minus the cost of vacancies’ creation.
Similarly, the average incomes of all workers in the perfect information case and in the case
of a full information asymmetry are Λ1WL + Λ
1
WH = Λ
1
W and Λ
0
WL + Λ
0
WH = Λ
0
W , respectively.
Moreover, the overall social welfare levels in cases of perfect information and a full information
asymmetry are Λ1W + Λ
1
F = Λ
1 and Λ0W + Λ
0
F = Λ
0, respectively.
In section 7 below, the overall social welfare levels, average income levels of workers and
average profits of firms in the asymmetric information, perfect information and full information
asymmetry case will be numerically compared.
7 Numerical example
7.1 Calibration
This section parameterizes the model to match the average labour market indicators in the
OECD countries. Let the productivity parameter y be normalized to 1. A unit period of time in
the model is chosen to be six months and the discount rate r is set to 0.01, which is equivalent
to the annual discount rate of 2%. Next, the flow value of leisure z is equal to 0.5, which is in
the middle range of values in the literature. Shimer (2005) sets this value to 0.4, while Fontaine
(2008) uses the value of 0.15 for the U.S. economy and 0.4 for the French economy. Gautier
(2002) and Cahuc and Fontaine (2009) set z equal to 0.2. On the other hand, Hall and Milgrom
(2008) obtain a larger value of 0.71. The cost of an open vacancy c is chosen to be 0.5 and is
also close to the average in the literature. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) set the value of 0.58
for this parameter, while Cahuc and Fontaines (2009) value is 0.4. Shimer (2005) has chosen the
value of 0.213 for the cost of vacancies while Fontaine (2008) uses the value of 0.3.
Let the number of actual contacts of type-L workers who can help in the job search be equal
to 50 and that of type H - to 90. These choices are in the middle range of numbers in the
literature. First, Ellison et al. (2014) report that, for adults in 2011, the mean number of actual
friends among their Facebook contacts was 76 out of the 207 total Facebook contacts on average
(37% are actual friends). Tong et al. (2008) report the mean of 395 total Facebook contacts
for undergraduate students. According to Statista (2014), the average number of Facebook
friends for all age groups is 350. Moreover, Ellison et al. (2011) report that, for undergraduate
students, the average fraction of actual friends on Facebook is 25%. Thus, considering relatively
younger generations, the average numbers of Facebook contacts of low and high types are equal
to 50/0.25=200 and 90/0.25=360, respectively. In addition, let the fraction of type L workers,
Pr(nL), be equal to 0.5 for easier comparability. Moreover, Rostila (2013) reports that the
percentage of people with poor social contacts varies between 21.7% and 65.1% for different
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education levels in European countries. Then, the average numbers of actual and Facebook
friends are equal to 70 and 280, respectively. These numbers are naturally a bit lower than those
in the literature since not all contacts usually help in the job search, in particular, workers of the
same profession tend to help more. Cingano and Rosolia (2012) find that the median number
of only professional contacts in Italy is equal to 32. This number is higher in Germany and is
equal to 43 (Glitz, 2013). At the same time, the mean number of actual contacts is equal to 50
in Cahuc and Fontaine (2009). Fontaine (2008) uses the number of 40 in a benchmark model
of his paper. Thus, 70 is a reasonable estimation for an average number of actual contacts who
can help to find a job. Moreover, let the standard deviation for the firms’ error σ take the value
of 10 in the benchmark case so that, for low types, a firm can receive a signal approximately
between 0 and 100 and, for high types, between 40 and 140 as on figure 1 (right panel). This
value is the maximal one for the signal to be positive in most of cases.
Figure 1: The densities f(n′|nL) (blue) and f(n′|nH) (red) for nL = 50 and nH = 90. σ = 5
(left) and σ = 10 (right).
In addition let the rate a with which employees hear about job vacancies be equal to 0.5.
This number is chosen for the average equilibrium job-finding rate to be close to values in
the literature. Hobijn und Sahin (2009) report using OECD (2006) ”Employment and Labour
Market Statistics” that the highest monthly job-finding rate is in the U.S. and is equal to 56.3%,
while the lowest one is in Italy, 2.58%. Therefore, the annual job finding rate varies between
0.00258 · 12 = 0.03 and 0.563 · 12 = 6.75. Parameter d0 is set to 5 so that δ(0) = 1/5 = 0.2.
This value corresponds to the average job duration without effort of 1/(2 · 0.2) = 2.5 years and
is close to the minimal value in the literature. Hall and Milgrom (2008) set the value of 3% per
month, so the average job duration is 1/(12 · 0.03) = 2.78 years. Pissarides (2009) and Shimer
(2005) choose the value of δ equal to 0.1 for a unit of time being a quarter. This corresponds to
the average job duration of 1/(4 · 0.1) = 2.5 years. Hobijn and Sahin (2009) report a value of
2.3% per month, so the average job duration becomes 1/(12 · 0.023) = 3.6 years. Let also k0 > 0
be equal to 2 · 10−5. This parameter is chosen for average job durations for equilibrium values
of effort to be large enough. Table 1 presents the calibration for the benchmark case. In Table
2, the comparison of equilibrium and social welfare outcomes in asymmetric information case,
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Variable Value Explanation
nL 50 Number of actual contacts of type L workers
nH 90 Number of actual contacts of type H workers
Pr(nL) 0.5 The share of type L workers
r 0.01 Annual interest rate of 2%
z 0.5 Unemployment benefit
σ 10 Standard deviation for the firms’ error
δ(0) 1/5 Average job duration of 2.5 years (without effort)
k0 2 · 10−5 δ(g) is close to the minimal for equilibrium effort values
c 0.5 Vacancy cost
γ 1 Degree of network homophily
a 0.5 The rate of hearing about job openings by employees
y 1 Workers’ productivity
Table 1: Values of the model parameters
perfect information case and the case of a full information asymmetry is presented.
In the asymmetric information case, the separation rate δ(gLH) is equal to 0.12069 corre-
sponding to the job duration of 1/(2 · 0.12069) = 4.14285 years. The separation rate δ(gL) is
larger and is equal to 0.12922, which corresponds to the job duration of 1/(2 ·0.12922) = 3.86937
years. The separation rate δ(gH) is the largest and is equal to 0.13188 corresponding to the job
duration of 1/(2 · 0.13188) = 3.79139 years. These high effort levels will naturally cause low
overall number of unemployed and a large amount of vacancies12.
For the case of the full information asymmetry, the wage offered is in between the low and
high wages in the asymmetric and perfect information cases. The overall social welfare is the
biggest in the asymmetric information case and the smallest in the perfect information case.
This may seem counterintuitive, since the asymmetric information case should naturally be in
between of the two extreme cases. In the next subsection, the reasons for this will be discussed.
Variable Asymmetric Perfect Full asymmetry
Low wage 0.84533 0.83732 0.85122
High wage 0.85829 0.8699 0.85122
Type-L reservation wage 0.8305 0.82157 0.83481
Type-H reservation wage 0.84616 0.85784 0.83946
Effort of low types at low wage 7.50096 7.76799 7.95924
Effort of low types at high wage 10.79608 - -
Effort of high types 6.67079 6.64786 6.55044
Overall unemployment rate 3.49426% 3.42372% 3.46373%
Unemployment rate of low types 4.08832% 4.02538% 4.02738%
Unemployment rate of high types 2.93084% 2.82206% 2.90009%
Threshold value of the signal 61.77651 - -
Number of vacancies 0.26662 0.26874 0.26752
Overall social welfare 0.8481 0.8475 0.8479
Table 2: Comparison of equilibrium and social optimum outcomes in asymmetric information
case, perfect information case and the case of a full information asymmetry
12The average unemployment rate in the United States in the recent years is 8.7% (BLS, 2009-2013). In addition,
Elsby et al. (2013) report that, for OECD countries, the unemployment rate varies between 3.3% for Japan and
15.4% for Spain in 1968-2009.
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7.2 Comparative statics
The most important comparative statics question in this model is what happens with the change
of σ? Consider the case of σ changing from 5 to 10. The signal distributions in the cases of σ
equal to 5 and 10 are illustrated on figure 1.
Figure 2: Left panel: Change in wL (black) with the increase in σ, w
1
L (blue) and w
0 (red).
Right panel: Change in wH (black) with the increase in σ, w
1
H (blue) and w
0 (red).
The threshold number of contacts n¯′ decreases from 68.93801 to 61.77651. Therefore, the
probability to hire a low type worker at the low wage after a match, Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL), decreases
from 0.97087 to 0.88053. Similarly, the probability not to hire a high type worker after a match,
Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nH), decreases slightly from 0.01759 to 0.00238 as the change in n¯′ has the smaller
effect in this case.
Changes in wage contracts and reservation wages are illustrated on figures 2 and 3, respec-
tively. The wage contract wL (wH) increases (decreases) from the value very close to w
1
L (w
1
H) to
the value close to w0 and the reservation wage rUL (rUH) increases (decreases) from the value
very close to rU1L (rU
1
H) to the value close to rU
0
L (rU
0
H).
This is intuitive, as a larger uncertainty of firms makes low types better off in terms of
reservation wages, and therefore, in wages since the probability of a low type to be considered
as a high type is higher and they always accept. High types are worse off in terms of wages
since they have to accept more offers competing with low types more which leads also to lower
reservation wages.
Changes in effort levels are illustrated on figure 4. The effort level gL is always larger than
gH . Therefore, JL > JH , and firms will always get more profit from more low type workers
employed.
The effort levels of low types, gL and gLH , decrease and the effort level of high types, gH ,
first increases and then decreases.
Intuitively, as the firms uncertainty increases, high type workers will be more interested in
exerting a higher effort level to increase the duration of a match, otherwise, when unemployed,
they will compete with low types more often. On the other hand, their wage will decrease, which
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has a negative effect on effort. The latter effect dominates when a firm’s uncertainty is already
large.
Figure 3: Left panel: Change in rUL (black) with the increase in σ, rU
1
L (blue) and rU
0
L (red).
Right panel: Change in rUH (black) with the increase in σ, rU
1
H (blue), rU
0
H (red).
On the contrary, low types will be less concerned about loosing the job and exert less effort.
This effect dominates the effect of a wage increase.
From the pictures it can be seen that the change in gLH is much larger than in gL and gH .
The change in gL is naturally larger than the change in gH as n¯
′ decreases.
Both unemployment rates, µL and µH , increase from the values very close to µ
1
L and µ
1
H .
This is illustrated on figure 5.
Figure 4: Left panel: Change in gL (solid) and in gLH (dashed, right axis) (black) with the
increase in σ, g
1
L (blue), g
0
L (red). Right panel: Change in gH (black) with the increase in σ,
g1H (blue), g
0
H (red).
The firms’ profit per low type worker employed at the low (high) wage, JL, (JLH) decreases
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(increases slightly) from 1.17521 to 1.111 (from 1.05771 to 1.08431). On the other hand, the
firms’ profit per high type worker, JH , increases from 0.9166 to 0.9988.
In order to check whether offering of two wage contracts is indeed an equilibrium strategy
of firms let us suppose that one firm deviates and offers either the wage rUL < w˜L < rUH or
w˜H > rUH to both types.
More precisely, when a firm adopts the strategy of two wage contracts wL and wH considered
in the model, it receives the following expected profit from hiring a worker as in the maximization
problem (6):
Jexp = βPr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL)JL + βPr(n′ > n¯′|nL)JLH + (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH)JH
Figure 5: Left panel: Change in µL (black) with the increase in σ, µ
1
L (blue) and µ
0
L (red).
Right panel: Change in µH (black) with the increase in σ, µ
1
H (blue) and µ
0
H (red).
On the contrary, the expected profit from hiring a worker when a firm deviates to offering
either w˜L or w˜H is, respectively:
JexpL = βmaxw˜L
J˜L J
exp
H = maxw˜H
{βJ˜LH + (1− β)J˜H}
where J˜L =
y − w˜L
r + δ(g˜L)
, J˜LH =
y − w˜H
r + δ(g˜LH)
and J˜H =
y − w˜H
r + δ(g˜H)
.
In the first maximization problem, the wage w˜L can be found analogously to w
1
L from the
Proposition 1 and is numerically equivalent to wL from the maximization problem (6) and,
therefore, the firm receives JL > JLH instead of JLH and looses (1− β)Pr(n′ > n¯′|nH)JH since
only low types accept.
In the second maximization problem, the wage w˜H can be found analogously to w
0 from the
Proposition 2.
From the figure 6 it can be seen that the strategy of offering two contracts is indeed the
optimal one for firms for σ from 5 to 10.
The job-finding rate λL decreases from 2.7929 to 2.73947 and the job-finding rate λH de-
creases from 4.27473 to 4.1116. The job-filling rate qL increases from 0.20918 to 0.21004 and
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the job-filling rate qH increases from 0.22447 to 0.22599.
Changes in the income levels of low and high type workers are illustrated on figure 7. ΛWL
naturally increases from the value very close to Λ1WL and leads to Λ
0
WL. On the other hand,
ΛWH decreases starting from the value very close to Λ
1
WH and leads to Λ
0
WH , which is also
intuitive.
The change in the average income of both worker types is illustrated on figure 8 (left panel).
It decreases from the value very close to Λ1W and naturally leads to Λ
0
W as ΛWH decreases faster
than ΛWL increases.
Figure 6: Change in Jexp (black), JexpL (red) and J
exp
H (blue) with the increase in σ.
The number of vacancies v decreases from the value very close to v1 (figure 9) (right panel).
Intuitively, firms anticipate that in the asymmetric information case they will offer mismatched
wages more often due to the larger probability of firms’ mistakes leading to lower expected
profits.
More precisely, when the firms’ uncertainty increases, as it can be seen from the free-entry
condition, there are two direct reinforcing effects influencing the number of vacancies mostly.
Both the probability to employ low types at low wages after a match, Pr(n′ ≤ n¯′|nL), and the
profit per hiring of such a worker, JL, decrease. Other effects are rather small and are dominated.
The change in the overall average profits of firms, ΛF , is illustrated on figure 8 (right panel).
It increases from the value very close to Λ1F and leads to Λ
0
F . This is intuitive as the number of
vacancies decreases.
The overall social welfare, Λ, increases from the value close to Λ1, leads to Λ0 and increases
further (figure 9 (left panel)) since ΛF increases faster than ΛW decreases.
As it was mentioned above, the increase in the overall social welfare with the increase in the
uncertainty of firms may seem counterintuitive.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies. So the information
asymmetry turns out to be welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which
they would not like to employ.
Indeed, in the standard search theory with perfect information (for example, Pissarides
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(2000)), the social welfare is maximized when the workers’ bargaining power is equal to the
elasticity of the job-filling rate.
This result is known as the Hosios condition. Otherwise, when the workers’ bargaining power
is too low (high), firms will open too many (few) vacancies due to low (high) wages leading to
more inefficiency.
Figure 7: Left panel: Change in ΛWL (black) with the increase in σ, Λ
1
WL (blue) and Λ
0
WL
(red). Right panel: Change in ΛWH (black) with the increase in σ, Λ
1
WH (blue) and Λ
0
WH
(red).
Since in the present model the wage is offered only by firms, the workers’ wages are relatively
low. Moreover, the number of vacancies in the perfect information case is larger than in the
asymmetric information case. This gives an intuition why the social welfare in the perfect
information case is not the largest since the Hosios condition is not satisfied.
Figure 8: Left panel: Change in ΛW (black) with the increase in σ, Λ
1
W (blue) and Λ
0
W (red).
Right panel: Change in ΛF (black) with the increase in σ, Λ
1
F (blue) and Λ
0
F (red).
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It is interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991) that social
contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between firms and
workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, it is the higher level
of mismatched wages offered which contributes to the increase in the welfare.
Figure 9: Left panel: Change in Λ (black) with the increase in σ, Λ
1 (blue) and Λ0 (red). Right
panel: Change in v (black) with the increase in σ, v
1 (blue) and v0 (red).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, the random matching model is proposed, in which firms face uncertainty about
workers’ number of social contacts defining their outside options in the sense of job search
through referrals. This number is known perfectly to workers who are homogeneous in all other
characteristics. Wages are assumed to be offered only by firms in a form of a take-it-or-leave-it
offer during the interview with a job seeker and a worker accepts a wage contract if it is at
least as large as her outside options. In addition, wages are set in such a way that workers will
have an incentive to exert effort. Firms also check the worker’s public number of non-fictitious
social contacts in the Social Network Systems in the Internet. This number is assumed to be
correlated to the actual number of social contacts and, therefore, serves as a noisy signal of the
social capital for firms. For simplicity, only two worker types are considered in the model: with
low and high social capital.
The semi-separating equilibrium with two wage contracts, which follows the threshold rule,
is considered. In this equilibrium, the higher wage will be accepted by both worker types and
the lower wage only by the low types leading only to partial separation. The model generates a
positive relationship between the number of contacts in the social media and the wage offered
by firms in the equilibrium. Thus, there will be a wage dispersion between equally productive
workers with different number of contacts in the Social Network System, which extends the
classical result on wage dispersion with respect to the signal in the literature on uncertainty
about the worker’s productivity. Therefore, this model gives an additional explanation for the
empirically observed wage dispersion between workers with equal productivity.
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Moreover, the comparative statics w.r.t. firms’ uncertainty level was conducted and the
equilibrium outcomes of this model were compared numerically with the two extreme cases: the
case of a perfect information and the case of a full information asymmetry. It was found that
(reservation) wages, the overall average firms’ profit and average workers’ income levels in the
asymmetric information case lead to those arising in the case of a full information asymmetry
as the firms’ uncertainty level increases. Thus, naturally, the equilibrium outcomes in the asym-
metric information case are in between of these two extreme cases. However, the overall social
welfare in the asymmetric information case is increasing which may seem counterintuitive.
One of the reasons for this is that firms anticipate that expected profits from an open vacancy
will decrease due to more mismatched wages offered and open less vacancies thus decreasing their
overall cost and leading to the welfare increase. So the information asymmetry turns out to be
welfare improving as firms, by chance, will employ less workers which they would not like to
employ. It is also interesting to compare this finding to the conclusion of Montgomery (1991)
that social contacts use leads to a higher level of social welfare due to a lower mismatch between
firms and workers as referrals reveal the quality of the match. In the present paper, it is a higher
level of mismatched wages offered that contributes to the increase in the welfare.
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10 Appendix
Appendix I. Proof of Proposition 1:
In order to determine the wage w1i , i = L,H offered by firms, let us find the first order
condition to the firm’s maximization problem (18), taking first into account that the optimal
effort g1i is a function of w
1
i − rU1i , i.e.:
w1i − rU1i = k(g1i )−
k′(g1i )
δ′(g1i )
(r + δ(g1i ))
Thus, by differentiating this equation w.r.t. g1i taking U
1
i parametrically, the inverse of
∂g1i
∂(w1i − rU1i )
can be found:
∂(w1i − rU1i )
∂g1i
= −(k
′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
(δ′(g1i ))2
(r + δ(g1i ))
Thus, the first order conditions to the problem (18) can be written as follows:
−(r + δ(g1i )) + (y − w1i )δ′(g1i )
(δ′(g1i ))
2
(r + δ(g1i ))(k
′′(g1i )δ′(g
1
i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
(r + δ(g1i ))
2
= 0
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From this equation, the expression for the optimal wage w1i can be obtained:
w1i = y −
(r + δ(g1i ))
2(k′′(g1i )δ
′(g1i )− δ′′(g1i )k′(g1i ))
(δ′(g1i ))3
Note that δ′(g) = −(2(d0 +√g)2√g)−1.
Since for r → 0 and d0 = 0, |k
′(g)
δ′(g)
|(r + δ(g)) + k(g) is a quadratic function, the optimal
workers’ effort function for a given wage is close to the square root of wage.
Appendix II. Proof of Proposition 2: Taking into account the derivatives of g0L and g
0
H ,
which can be found as in the proof of Proposition 1, the first order condition for the problem
(25) can be then written as follows:
β0 ·
−(r + δ(g0L)) + (y − w0)δ′(g0L)
(δ′(g0L))
2
(r + δ(g0L))(k
′′(g0L)δ′(g
0
L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L))
(r + δ(g0L))
2
+
+(1− β0) ·
−(r + δ(g0H)) + (y − w0)δ′(g0H)
(δ′(g0H))
2
(r + δ(g0H))(k
′′(g0H)δ′(g
0
H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H))
(r + δ(g0H))
2
= 0
Rewriting this equation leads to:
β0(r + δ(g0H))
2 · [−(r + δ(g0L)) + (y − w0)
(δ′(g0L))
3
(r + δ(g0L))(k
′′(g0L)δ′(g
0
L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L))
] +
+(1− β0)(r + δ(g0L))2 · [−(r + δ(g0H)) + (y − w0)
(δ′(g0H))
3
(r + δ(g0H))(k
′′(g0H)δ′(g
0
H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H))
] = 0
Simplifying this equation further gives the following expression:
β0(r + δ(g0H))
3(k′′(g0H)δ
′(g0H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H)) ·
·[−(r + δ(g0L))2(k′′(g0L)δ′(g0L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L)) + (y − w0)(δ′(g0L))3] +
+(1− β0)(r + δ(g0L))3(k′′(g0L)δ′(g0L)− δ′′(g0L)k′(g0L)) ·
·[−(r + δ(g0H))2(k′′(g0H)δ′(g0H)− δ′′(g0H)k′(g0H)) + (y − w0)(δ′(g0H))3] = 0
The last expression can be rewritten also as:
β0x0(g0H)[−
x0(g0L)
r + δ(g0L)
+ (y − w0)(δ′(g0L))3] +
+(1− β0)x0(g0L)[−
x(g0H)
r + δ(g0H)
+ (y − w0)(δ′(g0H))3] = 0
From this equation it is easy to receive the optimal w0:
w0 = y −
x0(g0L)x
0(g0H) · [
β0
r + δ(g0L)
+
(1− β0)
r + δ(g0H)
]
β0(δ′(g0L))3x0(g
0
H) + (1− β0)(δ′(g0H))3x0(g0L)
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